CURACAO -FLORIDA SUPREME COURTCITATIONS CASES OMMITED (INSOLVENT BANK)- MADURO CURIEL'S BANK - Florida Long-Arm Statute § 48.193(2) (1977), provides, in pertinent part : "General Jurisdiction" non-resident defendant

 

CURACAO -FLORIDA SUPREME COURTCITATIONS CASES OMMITED (INSOLVENT BANK)- MADURO CURIEL'S BANK - Florida Long-Arm Statute § 48.193(2)  (1977), provides, in pertinent part  : "General Jurisdiction" non-resident defendant

2021 FLORIDA STATUTES (Including 2021B Session)

48.193 Acts Subjecting PERSON to JURISDICTION OF COURTs STATE —

(1)(a) A person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby submits himself or herself and, if he or she is a natural person, his or her personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from any of the following acts:

1. Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state.

2. Committing a tortious act within this state.

3. Owning, using, possessing, or holding a mortgage or other lien on any real property within this state.

4. Contracting to insure a person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting.

5. With respect to a proceeding for alimony, child support, or division of property in connection with an action to dissolve a marriage or with respect to an independent action for support of dependents, maintaining a matrimonial domicile in this state at the time of the commencement of this action or, if the defendant resided in this state preceding the commencement of the action, whether cohabiting during that time or not. This paragraph does not change the residency requirement for filing an action for dissolution of marriage.

6. Causing injury to persons or property within this state arising out of an act or omission by the defendant outside this state, if, at or about the time of the injury, either:

a. The defendant was engaged in solicitation or service activities within this state; or

b. Products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use.

7. Breaching a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in this state.

8. With respect to a proceeding for paternity, engaging in the act of sexual intercourse within this state with respect to which a child may have been conceived.

9. Entering into a contract that complies with s. 685.102.

(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection, an order issued, or a penalty or fine imposed, by an agency of another state is not enforceable against any person or entity incorporated or having its principal place of business in this state if the other state does not provide a mandatory right of review of the agency decision in a state court of competent jurisdiction.

(2) A defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity.

(3) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as provided in this section may be made by personally serving the process upon the defendant outside this state, as provided in s. 48.194. The service shall have the same effect as if it had been personally served within this state.

(4) If a defendant in his or her pleadings demands affirmative relief on causes of action unrelated to the transaction forming the basis of the plaintiff’s claim, the defendant shall thereafter in that action be subject to the jurisdiction of the court for any cause of action, regardless of its basis, which the plaintiff may by amendment assert against the defendant.

(5) Nothing contained in this section limits or affects the right to serve any process in any other manner now or hereinafter provided by law.

History.—s. 1, ch. 73-179; s. 3, ch. 84-2; s. 3, ch. 88-176; s. 3, ch. 93-250; s. 281, ch. 95-147; s. 1, ch. 2013-164; s. 2, ch. 2016-207.

Oriental Imports and Export Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank N.V., 701 F.2d 889,893 (11th Cir.1983)

Court Case :  701 F.2d 889 (11th Cir. 1983)

Neither do Maduro Curiel's Bank's activities in Florida considered collectively show a general course of business activity in the state. Compare Compuguide v. Sachs, 259 So.2d 513 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1972) (contract to purchase all of Florida corporation's stock did not constitute business venture sufficient for jurisdiction) with Anson v. Lemperuer, 390 So.2d 478 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1980) (jurisdiction where express object of partnership was to acquire land in Florida and develop condominium units). Instead, the activities show merely a correspondent banking relationship coupled with a passive investment in Federal Funds. We conclude that these activities of Maduro Curiel's Bank do not amount to conducting a business in Florida sufficient for the assertion of long-arm jurisdiction under Fla. Stat.Ann. § 48.193(1)(a)

Court Case NO: . 09-80182-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON (S.D. Fla. Sep. 15, 2009) 

In FLORIDA, LONG ARM STATUTES are strictly construed, see, e.g., Bank of Wessington v. Winters Government Securities Corp., 361 So.2d 757, 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), and the language of the statute cannot be read broadly enough to characterize Picerne's communications with Plaintiffs as the carrying on of a business venture in this state. See Dinsmore v. Martin Blumenthal Assoc., Inc., 314 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1975); Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889 (11th Cir. 1983). The Court concludes that Picerne was not engaged in a business venture in Florida; rather it is engaged in a business venture in North Carolina that from time to time entailed communication with at least one Florida individual and one Florida corporation. This will not support jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(a)

Case No. 8:09-cv-986-T-33TBM (M.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2010) 

In FLORIDA, LONG ARM STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED, see, e.g., Bank of Wessington v. Winters Gov't Sec. Corp., 361 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), and the language of the statute cannot be read broadly enough to characterize Advanced Composite's isolated and minimally revenue-producing sales as the carrying on of a business venture in this state. See Dinsmore v. Martin Blumenthal Assocs., Inc., 314 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1975);Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889 (11th Cir. 1983). The Court concludes that Advanced Composite was not engaged in a business venture in Florida such that it would support the exercise of personal jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(a)

Case No.:  592 F. Supp. 1250 (M.D. La. 1984

The Bank does CORRESPONDENT BANKING with two Louisiana banks, but a correspondent banking relationship alone has been held insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over an OUT STATE BANK. Oriental Imports Exports v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, 701 F.2d 889 (11th Cir. 1983). An unspecified number of loans have been made by the Bank to Louisiana residents, and the Bank has more than one hundred accounts standing in the names of Louisiana residents, but there has been no showing that the accounts were solicited in Louisiana or that they are of such substantiality to permit this Court to exercise general jurisdiction. In Trans-Continental Investment Corp. v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 500 F. Supp. 565 (C.D.Cal. 1980), the court found that loans to borrowers in the forum state totalling $9.1 million and comprising approximately four percent of the bank's commercial loan portfolio were insufficient to confer general jurisdiction upon the court. The only other forum related activity of the Bank is that it is the trustee of trusts unrelated to this cause of action which involve property located in Louisiana

Case No.:  65 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995) 

The cases Royal cites are not to the contrary. Its reliance on Oriental Imports Exports v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, 701 F.2d 889 (11th Cir. 1983), is entirely misplaced. As an initial matter, Oriental Imports was a diversity case that addressed the question of personal jurisdiction under Florida law. Id. at 890. Florida law requires a more substantial connection to the forum state than does the federal Due Process Clause. Id. at 890-92. That aside, even if we assume, as Oriental Imports decided, that a foreign bank may maintain a "correspondent account" at a local bank without subjecting itself to jurisdiction, Royal did much more than merely keep correspondent accounts in the United States; it purposefully relied on U.S. residents for well over half of its business. The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Oriental Imports is, at best, inapposite to the decision of this case

Case No.:  94 F.3d 623 (11th Cir. 1996)

Florida's long-arm statute is to be strictly construed. Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 891 (11th Cir. 1983). Under Florida law, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving personal jurisdiction: "When a defendant raises through affidavits, documents or testimony a meritorious challenge to personal jurisdiction, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction by affidavits, testimony or documents." Jet Charter Serv., Inc. v. Koeck, 907 F.2d 1110, 1112 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937, 111 S.Ct. 1390, 113 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991). Florida's long-arm statute, Fla.Stat. ch. 48.193 (1993), provides in relevant part:

Case No.: 07-80098-CIV-RYSKAMP/VITUNAC (S.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2007)

The determination of whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant involves a two-part analysis. See Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 855 (11th Cir. 1990). First, the court must determine whether the requirements of the applicable state statute governing personal jurisdiction are satisfied. See Miami Breakers Soccer Club v. Women's United Soccer Association, 140 F.Supp.2d 1325, 1327 (S.D. Fla. 2001). Second, the court must determine whether its exercise of personal jurisdiction meets the requirements of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. (citing Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000)). A federal court applying Florida's long-arm statute must do so as would the Florida Supreme Court. See id. at 1328 (citing Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890 (11th Cir. 1983)). "A plaintiff seeking to subject a nonresident defendant to jurisdiction of the court through the long-arm statute must do more than allege facts to show a possibility of jurisdiction." Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Jet Charter Service…

Case No: 825 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D. Fla. 1992)

Plaintiff asserts that this Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants pursuant to the Florida Long-Arm Statute because they committed a tort within the state. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 48.193(1)(b). The reach of the Florida long-arm statute is a question of Florida law. Therefore, this Court must construe the statute just as the Florida Supreme Court would construe it. Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983). However, this Court may rely on federal court construction of state law in the absence of supervening state court interpretations. Spencer Boat Co. v. Liutermoza, 498 F.2d 332 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 503 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1974). The Florida long-arm statute must also be strictly construed to ensure compliance with due process requirements. Oriental Imports Exports, Inc., 701 F.2d at 891; Green v. USF G Corp, 772 F. Supp. 1258 (S.D.Fla. 1991). Moreover, Plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction when the district court does not conduct an evidentiary hearing on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Cable/Home

Case No. 00-3518-CIV-GRAHAM (S.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2001)

The reach of the Florida Long-Arm Statute is a question of Florida law. Therefore, the Court must construe the statute in accord with the Florida Supreme Court's construction. See Oriental Imports Exports Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990). Under Florida law, a defendant wishing to contest the jurisdictional allegations of a complaint or to raise a contention of minimum contacts must file affidavits in support of his position. See Venetian Salami Co. v. Barthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 503 (Fla. 1989). If the defendant sufficiently challenges plaintiff's assertions, then the burden is placed upon the plaintiff to prove by affidavit, or other competent sworn proof, the basis upon which jurisdiction is obtained. See Id. Where the affidavits conflict, the court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Id. 1. Florida Long-Arm Statute § 48.193(2): "General Jurisdiction"

Case No,: 44 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (M.D. Fla. 1999)

Florida's long-arm statute is strictly construed, and the Plaintiff has the burden of proving facts sufficient to satisfy the statutory criteria. Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 891 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Polymers, Inc. v. Ultra Flo Filtration Systems, Inc., 33 F. Supp.2d 1008 (M.D.Fla. 1998). Florida's long-arm statute, § 48.193 (1977), provides, in pertinent part

Case No. : 916 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1990)

The reach of the Florida long-arm statute is a question of Florida law. Therefore, federal courts are required to construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court. Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983); Moore v. Lindsey, 662 F.2d 354, 357-58 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).

Case No.: 5:06cv15-RS (N.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2006)

The plaintiff's response to the defendant's 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss is limited to addressing why it has satisfied the due process requirements imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court, however, must initially determine whether the plaintiff has complied with the requirements imposed by the Florida Long Arm statute before turning to the issue of whether the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment have been met. The Court will interpret Florida's Long Arm Statute in a manner consistent with the Florida Supreme Court. Oriental Imports Exports, Inc., v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983).

CASE NO.: 08-22859-CIV COOKE/BANDSTRA (S.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2009)

"The determination of personal jurisdiction over a NON RESIDENT DEFENDANT requires a two-part analysis." Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990). First, a district court considers the jurisdictional question under the forum state's LONG ARM STATUTE. Id. "[A] federal court in a diversity action may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only to the extent permitted by the long-arm statute of the forum state." Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890 (11th Cir. 1983). If the state long-arm statute provides a basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction, the court must next determine whether "sufficient minimum contacts exist to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Both prongs of the test must be satisfied in order to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.

Case No.: 838 F. Supp. 572 (M.D. Fla. 1993)

Defendant IVERSON correctly states that the reach of the Florida long-arm statute is a question of Florida law, and Federal Courts are required to construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court. Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983). Defendant also correctly states that in Florida, a partner is an agent of the partnership when carrying on the business of the partnership in the usual way. Fla.Stat. § 620.60(1). However, this Court does not agree that the letter written to the Tampa Tribune by Defendant GARRICK on the letterhead of IVERSON was not authorized by IVERSON nor part of IVERSON's "usual" business. As a partner in IVERSON, GARRICK'S acts in the partnership's name bind the partnership. The Florida Partnership Act provides:

Case No.: 3:07-cv-1192-J16-MCR (M.D. Fla. Jul. 7, 2008)

In a diversity action, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only to the extent permitted by the long-arm statute of the forum state. See Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890 (11th Cir. 1983). Florida's long-arm statute is Fla. Stat. § 48.193. Florida's long-arm statute provides for two distinct categories of personal jurisdiction: specific jurisdiction conferred under § 48.193(1) and general jurisdiction conferred under § 48.193(2). Miller v. Berman, 289 F.Supp.2d 1327, 1331 (M.D. Fla. 2003). A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only when plaintiff's cause of action arises from or is directly related to a defendant's contacts with the forum state. Alternatively, a court may exercise general jurisdiction when the suit does not arise out of the non-residents's activities in the forum state so long as the non-resident is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity in the state.

Case No.: 634 F. Supp. 782 (S.D. Fla. 1986)

A federal district court has personal jurisdiction in a diversity case when a state court of the same forum would have jurisdiction. Amenability to jurisdiction is determined by the application of a two prong test: (1) the court must determine through application of state law whether the forum state could assert long arm jurisdiction and (2) if there is jurisdiction through the state's long arm statute, the court must determine that "the exercise of personal jurisdiction is consonant with `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' and that the nonresident defendant had sufficient `minimal contacts with the forum state so as to avoid offending the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' See Pedelahore v. Astropark, Inc., 745 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1984) quoting in part International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) and Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890 (11th Cir. 1983). However, since this Court determines that the forum state court could not exercise long arm jurisdiction in this case, there is no need to determine the second prong of the test.

Case No.: 911 F. Supp. 518 (M.D. Fla. 1995)

The reach of the Florida Long-Arm Statute is a question of Florida law. Therefore, this Court must construe the statute in accord with the Florida Supreme Court's construction. Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983). The Florida Long-Arm Statute must be strictly construed to comport with due process requirements. Id. at 891. Moreover, where the Court does not conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the sufficiency of Defendants' contacts with the forum state, Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over non-resident Defendants. This occurs only when Plaintiff presents "sufficient evidence to defeat a motion for directed verdict." Cable/Home Communication, 902 F.2d at 855.

Case No.: 796 F. Supp. 1333 (C.D. Cal. 1992)

See, e.g., Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, 701 F.2d 889, 891-92 (11th Cir. 1983), where a Netherlands Antilles Bank that maintained correspondent banking relationships with Florida banks was not subject to the jurisdiction of a Florida Court. "It would be a distortion of due process to hold that a state acquires general personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state bank . . . merely because the bank has a correspondent relationship with a bank within the state and a balance on deposit with its correspondent bank." Id. at 892.

Case No.: 960 F. Supp. 292 (S.D. Fla. 1997) 

Florida's long-arm statute is a question of Florida law. Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890 (11th Cir. 1983). Accordingly, federal courts are required to construe

Case No.: 901 F. Supp. 1567 (M.D. Fla. 1995)

The reach of the Florida Long-Arm Statute is a question of Florida law. Therefore, this Court must construe the statute in accord with the Florida Supreme Court's construction. Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983). The Florida Long-Arm Statute must be strictly construed to comport with due process requirements. Id. at 891. Moreover, where the Court does not conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the sufficiency of Defendant's contacts with the forum state, Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over non-resident Defendants. This occurs only when Plaintiff presents "sufficient evidence to defeat a motion for directed verdict." Cable/Home Communication, 902 F.2d at 855.

Case No.: 886 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Fla. 1995)

In diversity cases, a challenge to personal jurisdiction is analyzed first by determining whether a defendant can be properly served with process under the applicable state long-arm statute. Sun Bank, N.A. v. E.F. Hutton Co., Inc., 926 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir. 1991). If not, the case must be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. If the state long-arm statute permits assertion of jurisdiction, the court must then determine if sufficient "minimum contacts" exist to satisfy the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. In applying the Florida long-arm statute, a district court is required to construe the statute as would the Supreme Court of Florida, since the reach of the statute is a question of state law. Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983). Florida's long-arm statute is strictly construed, and the burden of proving facts which justify use of the statute is on the plaintiff. Id. The Supreme Court of Florida has emphasized that, unlike in many jurisdictions, the Florida long-arm statute has not been construed as going to the limits of due process, and the jurisdictional

Case No.: 451 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2006)

Plaintiff asserts that jurisdiction is proper under Florida Statute § 48.193(1)(b). The Court applies Florida law with respect to interpreting the state's long-arm statute. Graphic Controls Corp. v. Utah Med. Prods., Inc., 149 F.3d 1382, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Florida's long-arm statute must be strictly construed, and the burden of proving facts that allow for jurisdiction is on the plaintiff. Oriental Imp. Exp., Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 891 (11th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). Florida Statute § 48.193(1)(b) provides for specific jurisdiction over a cause of action arising from the commission of a tortious act within the state of Florida. A court may find jurisdiction pursuant to § 48.193(1)(b) even if the defendant was not physically present in the state of Florida at the time the tort was allegedly committed if the situation is one "in which a foreign tortious act causes injury within the forum." Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 857 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Rebozo v. Washington Post, Co., 515 F.2d 1208, 1212 (5th Cir. 1975); Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So.2d 1252, 1260 (Fla. 2002)).

Case No.: 140 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2001)

A federal court when applying Florida's long arm statute must strictly construe the long arm statute as would the Florida Supreme Court. See Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890 (11th Cir. 1983). "A plaintiff seeking to subject a nonresident defendant to jurisdiction of the court through the long-arm statute must do more than allege facts that show a possibility of jurisdiction." Jet Charter Service, Inc. v. Koeck, 907 F.2d 1110, 1112 (11th Cir. 1990). If a plaintiff alleges personal jurisdiction, then it bears the initial burden of pleading facts to support personal jurisdiction over the defendant in its complaint. See Future Tech. Today, Inc., 218 F.3d 1247,1249 (11th Cir. 2000). The burden then shifts to the defendant after the plaintiff pleads sufficient facts to support a court exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. The defendant may by affidavits, testimony or other documents challenge the plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations. If the defendant is successful in challenging the plaintiff's assertions of personal jurisdiction, then the burden shifts back to plaintiff to substantiate its…

Case No.: 523 F. Supp. 2d 1348 (S.D. Fla. 2007)

Whether Florida's long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction is a question of Florida law. Id. I am, therefore, required to construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court. Id. (citing Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983); Moore v. Lindsey. 662 F.2d 354, 357-58 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981)).

Case No.: Case No. 8:05-cv-2371-T-24MAP (M.D. Fla. May. 2, 2006)

In determining this Court's personal jurisdiction over Defendants, the Eleventh Circuit requires that this Court strictly construe Florida Statute § 48.193 to ensure compliance with due process requirements. See Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, 701 F.2d 889, 891 (11th Cir. 1983). Moreover, federal courts are required to construe Florida's long-arm jurisdiction statute as it is construed by the Florida Supreme Court. See id. at 890-91. Florida's long-arm statute provides, in pertinent part:

Case No.: CASE NO. 07-CV-22015-UNGARO (S.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2009)

In this case, Plaintiffs contend that the MK Defendants are subject to the general jurisdiction of the Florida courts pursuant to Florida's long-arm statute because they engage in "substantial and not isolated activity within the State." See Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2). The Eleventh Circuit has made clear that "Florida's long-arm statute is to be strictly construed" and that "the plaintiff bears the burden of proving personal jurisdiction." Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Jet Charter Serv., Inc. v. Koeck, 907 F.2d 1110, 1112 (11th Cir. 1990); Oriental Imports Exports, Inc., v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 891 (11th Cir. 1983)). The reach of the Florida long-arm is a question of Florida law; thus, the Court must construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court. Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted); Aspsoft, Inc. v. WebClay, 983 So. 2d 761, 765 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).

Case No.: 197 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 1999)

The real issue in this case is not whether Proficol is liable for the underlying CERCLA violation — the spill — but whether it is liable for the excess spent to clean up the spill. This is the basis of Transport's claim and the alleged tort for which it seeks to recover, and it did not occur in Florida. Although injury in Florida may have resulted from Proficol's alleged negligence, the Florida courts have made very clear that "the occurrence of the injury alone in the forum state does not satisfy the statutory test." Jack Pickard Dodge, Inc. v. Yarbrough, 352 So.2d 130, 134 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). See also Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank. N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 893 (11th Cir. 1983).

Case No.: 907 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1990) 

Our review of a district court's determination of the existence or non-existence of personal jurisdiction involves evaluating the same documentary evidence relied on by the district court, and therefore we review such determinations de novo. Alexander Proudfoot Co. World Headquarters L.P. v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1989). In a diversity action, a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants only to the extent permitted by the forum state's long-arm statute. Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890 (11th Cir. 1983)

Case No.: 693 F. Supp. 1073 (S.D. Fla. 1987)

Determining whether a diversity court has in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant involves a two-part inquiry, first into the applicable state statute, and then into the requirements of federal due process. Pesaplastic, C.A. v. Cincinnati Milacron Co., 750 F.2d 1516, 1521 (11th Cir. 1985). Plaintiffs have adequately stated the grounds for the court's jurisdiction over U.S. Mineral, a foreign corporation, in compliance with Florida's long arm statute. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 48.193 (West Supp. 1987). See Oriental Imports Exports v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, 701 F.2d 889, 890 (11th Cir. 1983). They have alleged that all named defendants have transacted substantial revenue-producing business in the state of Florida since 1942, complaint ¶ 24, which means that they are "engaged in substantial and not isolated activity" within the state. Fla.Stat. §§ 48.181, 48.193(2). Plaintiffs need not do more at this stage. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (motion to dismiss may be granted only if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim). In the absence of affidavits controverting…

Case No. : 8:06-cv-1973-T-30TGW (M.D. Fla. Aug. 26, 2008)

In applying the Florida long-arm statute, a district court is required to construe the statute as would the Supreme Court of Florida, since the reach of the statute is a question of state law. Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983).

Case No.: 189 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (M.D. Fla. 2002)

Fla. Stat. § 48.193. Because the Florida long-arm statute is governed by state law, federal courts are required to construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court. Kim v. Keenan, 71 F. Supp.2d 1228, 1233 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (citing Lockard v. Equifax, Inc., 163 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 1998)). Additionally, Florida's long-arm statute must be strictly construed, and the burden of proving facts that justify use of the statute is on the plaintiff. Id. (citing Oriental Imports Exports. Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-891 (11th Cir. 1983)).

Case No. : 717 F. Supp. 812 (S.D. Fla. 1989)

In addition to dismissing the action due to the statute of limitations bar, the court can dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. In a diversity action, a federal court "may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only to the extent permitted by the long-arm statute of the forum state." Oriental Imports Exports v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, 701 F.2d 889, 890 (11th Cir. 1983). Once the defendant is found to fall within the provisions of the long-arm statute, the court must determine whether subjecting the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court is constitutionally permissible. Rebozo v. Washington Post Co., 515 F.2d 1208, 1211 (5th Cir. 1975). The reach of the state's long-arm statute is not unbounded, but rather is limited by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 470 n. 12, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2181 n. 12, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). Thus, the court proceeds to a two-part inquiry to determine whether jurisdiction is proper under the long-arm statute.

Case No.: 8:09-cv-2144-T-33TBM (M.D. Fla. Jun. 18, 2010)

In Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Southeastern Mechanical Services, Inc., 2010 WL 2509505 (M.D. Fla. June 18, 2010), Liberty Mutual filed a declaratory judgment action in Florida to determine whether it owed coverage to Southeastern Mechanical Services, Inc. (a Florida corporation), which had been sued by Texas-based electrical power generator San Miguel Electrical Cooperative, Inc. in federal court in Texas.

The reach of the Florida Long-Arm Statute is a question of Florida law, and thus "Federal courts are required to construe the law as would the Florida Supreme Court." Oriental Imps. Exps., Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, 701 F.2d 889, 890-891 (11th Cir. 1983). Additionally, "absent some indication that the Florida Supreme Court would hold otherwise, [federal courts] are bound to adhere to the decisions of [Florida's] intermediate courts." Polskie Linie Oceaniczne v. Seasafe Transp. A/S, 795 F.2d 968, 970 (11th Cir. 1986).

Case No. : 947 F. Supp. 473 (M.D. Fla. 1996)

As stated above, the Court must accept the facts alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint as true, to the extent that the facts are not contradicted by Defendants' affidavits. Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 855 (11th Cir. 1990). Where there is conflicting evidence, the court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id. In the present case, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's Complaint alleges the intentional tortious acts adequately. The Court relies on Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983) in stating that Florida's long-arm statute must be strictly construed, and the burden of proving facts which justify use of the statute is on Plaintiff.

Case No.: 07-22219-CIV-MOORE (S.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2007)

"Because the reach of the Florida long-arm statute is a question of Florida state law, federal courts are required to construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court." Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (citing Moore v. Lindsey, 662 F.2d 354, 357-58 (5th Cir. 1981); Jetco Electronic Industries, Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1232 (5th Cir. 1973)). Furthermore, the Florida long-arm statute is to be strictly construed. Id. The Plaintiff bears the burden of proving personal jurisdiction. Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir. 1996).

Case No.: 668 So. 2d 552 (Ala. 1995) 

"When a share draft is accepted for deposit by a bank, the depositary bank forwards the share draft to a collecting bank for collection and payment. Because Empire serves as the payable-through bank for MONY, Empire's federal reserve routing number appears on the face of the share drafts issued on accounts maintained with MONY. Consequently, the collecting bank will forward the share draft directly to Empire for payment, and MONY never receives the actual share draft as part of the payment process. When Empire receives a share draft for payment, it electronically transmits the relevant payment information (the member account number at MONY, serial number, amount, date received by Empire, etc.) to MONY. After receiving the relevant payment information, MONY will determine if the share draft should be paid by Empire. At the end of each business day, MONY makes a payment to Empire for all share drafts paid by Empire for that business day.

Case No.: 6:03-cv-887-Orl-31JGG (M.D. Fla. Oct. 21, 2003)

To determine if personal jurisdiction exists, a court must conduct a two-part inquiry. First, this Court must assess whether a provision of Florida's long-arm statute applies. Future Tech. Today, Inc., 218 F.3d at 1249 (citing Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623 (11th Cir. 1996)); Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N. V., 701 F.2d 889, 891 (11th Cir. 1983). If so, then the Court will inquire whether the Due Process Clause has been satisfied, including sufficient minimum contacts and satisfaction of traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Future Tech. Today, Inc., 218 F.3d at 1249; Nida Corp. v. Nida, 118 F. Supp.2d 1223, 1228 (M.D. Fla. 2000).

Case No.:  896 F. Supp. 1190 (M.D. Fla. 1995)

Personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant must be authorized by specific legislation: the state's "long-arm" statute. Omni Capital Int'l. v. Rudolf Wolff Co., 484 U.S. 97, 109, 108 S.Ct. 404, 412, 98 L.Ed.2d 415 (1987). Because the reach of the Florida long-arm statute is a question of Florida law, federal courts are required to construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court. Madara, 916 F.2d at 1514 (citing Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983)); Cable/Home, 902 F.2d at 856. In this instance, the relevant portion of the long-arm is its "Tortious Act Provision." FLA.STAT.ANN. § 48.193(1)(b).

Case No.: 71 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (M.D. Fla. 1999) 

Because the Florida long-arm statute is governed by state law, federal courts are required to construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court. See Lockard v. Equifax, Inc., 163 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 1998). Additionally, Florida's long-arm statute must be strictly construed, and the burden of proving facts which justify use of the statute is on the plaintiff. See Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983). However, Florida courts are "deeply divided" on the issue of whether a tortious act committed outside the state resulting in injury in the state produces personal jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(b). Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., Ltd., 178 F.3d 1209, 1216. While mindful of this rift in the Florida circuits, the Eleventh Circuit has found that "jurisdiction under § 48.193(1)(b) '[is] not limited to a situation where an act in Florida cause[s] an injury in Florida but also . . . reache[s] the situation where a foreign tortious act cause[s] injury in Florida.'" Sun Bank, N.A. v. E.F. Hutton Co., Inc., 926 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Universal Marine Co., 543 F.2d 1107

 Case No.::  6:10-cv-1463-Orl-28DAB (M.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2011)

§ 48.193(1), Fla. Stat. "The reach of the Florida long-arm statute is a question of Florida state law" and therefore, this Court is "required to construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court." Oriental Imps. Exps., Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). "The Florida long-arm statute is strictly construed," id. at 891, and "the plaintiff bears the burden of proving" its application,Sculptchair, 94 F.3d at 627.

CASE NO.: . 09-81288-CIV-MARRA (S.D. Fla. May. 24, 2010)

With respect to Plaintiff's assertion that Florida Statute § 48.193(1)(a) applies, the Court finds that there is simply no connexity between the business engaged in by Defendant and the claim of copyright infringement. Although Plaintiff claims Defendant, as an individual, engaged in a business by serving as an employee, officer and director of Plaintiff, Plaintiff has adduced no evidence demonstrating that Defendant, as an individual, has engaged in any activity in Florida that constitutes engaging in a business. To begin, the vast majority of evidence submitted by Plaintiff involves acts by Defendant in the 1990s. In fact, the unrefuted evidence demonstrates that Defendant's affiliation with Plaintiff for the past eleven years has been in the role of shareholder, and not as employee, officer or director. Mere investment in a Florida corporation, standing alone, is not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 893 (11th Cir. 1983) (noting that under earlier Florida statutes, investment by a nonresident was not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction); Uible v. Landstreet, 392 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1968… 

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Case No. 07-14254-CIV-MOORE/LYNCH (S.D. Fla. Nov. 12, 2008)

A determination of whether personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant exists requires a two-part analysis. D.W. Mercer, Inc. v. Valley Fresh Produce, Inc., 146 F. Supp.2d 1274, 1276 (M.D.Fla. 2001). First, the Court must consider the jurisdictional question under the Florida state long-arm statute. See id.; see also Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1). If there is a basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction under the state statute, the Court will next determine "whether sufficient minimum contacts exist to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."D.W. Mercer, Inc., 146 F. Supp.2d at 1276 (citing Robinson v. Giarmarco Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253, 256 (11th Cir. 1996)). Only if both prongs of the analysis are satisfied may a federal or state court exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. See Robinson v. Giarmarco Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253, 256 (11th Cir. 1996). "Because the reach of the Florida long-arm statute is a question of Florida state law, federal courts are required to construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court." Oriental Imports…

Case No.:  814 F. Supp. 1058 (M.D. Fla. 1993) 

In examining the Florida long-arm statute, the court must construe the statute as would the Florida Supreme Court, since the reach of the statute is a question of state law. Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V, 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983). Florida's long-arm statute must be strictly construed, and the burden of proving facts which justify use of the statute is on the plaintiff. Id. at 891.

Case No.:. 6:10-cv-1951-Orl-19GJK (M.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2011)

"The Florida long-arm statute is strictly construed, and the person invoking jurisdiction under it has the burden of proving facts which clearly justify" its use. Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 891 (11th Cir. 1983). Under Florida's longarm statute, an out-of-state corporation submits itself to the jurisdiction of Florida courts "for any cause of action arising from the doing of," among other things, the following acts:

Case No.: 118 F. Supp. 2d 1223 (M.D. Fla. 2000)

This Court examines the Florida long-arm statute as would the Florida Supreme Court because the reach of the statute is a question of state law. See Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983); Structural Panels, Inc. v. Texas Aluminum Industries, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 1058, 1064 (M.D.Fla. 1993). Florida's long-arm statute is strictly construed, and the plaintiff has the burden of proving facts which satisfy the criteria. Oriental Imports Exports, 701 F.2d at 891. The pertinent subsections of Florida's long-arm statute provide:

Case No.:  8:01-CV-1176-T-27MAP (M.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2002) 

A federal court in a diversity action may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only to the extent permitted by the long-arm statute of the forum state. Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir. 1996); Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890 (11th Cir. 1983). In determining whether long-arm jurisdiction is appropriate, Florida courts inquire as to whether the complaint alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of the Florida long-arm statute, § 48.193, Fla. Stat. (1999). Venetian Salami, 554 So.2d at 502

Case No.: 6:05-cv-832-Orl-28JGG (M.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2006)

This Court examines the Florida long-arm statute as would the Florida Supreme Court because the reach of the statute is a question of state law. See Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983); Madara v. Hall, 814 F. Supp. 1058, 1064 (M.D. Fla. 1993). Florida's long-arm statute is strictly construed, and the plaintiff has the burden of proving facts which satisfy the criteria. Oriental Imports Exports. 701 F.2d at 891. The pertinent subsections of Florida's long-arm statute provide:

Case No.:  3:01-cv-471/LAC (N.D. Fla. Sep. 10, 2002)

Because the reach of Florida's long-arm statute is a question of Florida law, this Court must construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court. Id. Moreover, Florida's long-arm statute must be strictly construed, and the burden of proving facts which justifies its application lies with the plaintiff. Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983). Florida's long-arm statute provides, in relevant part:

Case No.: 506 F. Supp. 2d 1113 (N.D. Fla. 2007)

Florida's long-arm statute is to be strictly construed.Sculptchair, 94 F.3d at 627 (citing Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 891 (11th Cir. 1983)). Additionally, because the extent of the long-arm statute is governed by Florida law, any construction of the statute by a federal court must rely on prior decisions of the Florida Supreme Court construing the statute. Id. (citations omitted). In the event the Florida Supreme Court has not addressed a particular construction of the statute, a federal court is bound by the decisions of the state's intermediate appellate courts, absent some indication the Florida Supreme Court would decide otherwise. Id. (citations omitted).

Case No.: 991 F. Supp. 2d 1214 (S.D. Fla. 2013)   

Florida's long-arm statute is to be strictly construed. Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 891 (11th Cir.1983). “Under Florida law, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving personal jurisdiction: When a defendant raises through affidavits, documents or testimony a meritorious challenge to personal jurisdiction, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction by affidavits, testimony or documents.' ” Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir.1996) (citing Jet Charter Serv., Inc. v. Koeck, 907 F.2d 1110, 1112 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937, 111 S.Ct. 1390, 113 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991)). “A plaintiff seeking to subject a nonresident defendant to jurisdiction of the court through the long-arm statute must do more than allege facts that show a possibility of jurisdiction.” Jet Charter Serv., Inc. v. Koeck, 907 F.2d 1110, 1112 (11th Cir.1990).

Case No.: 23-CV-81280-ROSENBERG/REINHART (S.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 2023)

Fourth, to the extent the Court has any doubt about whether the employment agreement required production to a Florida address, the Court's doubt is dispelled by the standard that the Court must apply to the requirements of the long-arm statute. The standard is that the long-arm statute must be strictly construed against the party asserting personal jurisdiction. E.g., Scuptchair Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir. 1996). The Plaintiff carries the burden “of proving facts which clearly justify the use” of the long-arm statute. Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 891 (11th Cir. 1983). Here, the Plaintiff has not carried its burden; the Court is not persuaded that the Defendant's duty to return confidential materials upon termination required his performance of that duty to occur in Florida.

Case No.: 33 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (M.D. Fla. 1998)

This Court examines the Florida long-arm statute as would the Florida Supreme Court because the reach of the statute is a question of state law. See Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983); Structural Panels, Inc. v. Texas Aluminum Industries, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 1058, 1064 (M.D.Fla. 1993). Florida's long-arm statute is strictly construed, and the plaintiff has the burden of proving facts which satisfy the criteria. Oriental Imports Exports, 701 F.2d at 891. The pertinent subsections of Florida's long-arm statute provide:

Case No.: 191 F. Supp. 3d 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2016)

When a federal court uses a state long-arm statute, because the extent of the statute is governed by state law, the federal court is required to construe it as would the state's supreme court." Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int'l, Inc. , 593 F.3d 1249, 1258 (11th Cir.2010) (quoting Lockard v. Equifax, Inc ., 163 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir.1998) ). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit has noted that the statute should be strictly construed. See Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank , 701 F.2d 889, 891 (11th Cir.1983) (internal citations omitted).

Case No.: Case No: 8:00-CIV-275-T-23EAJ (M.D. Fla. Jul. 3, 2003)

Federal courts are required to construe the Florida long-arm statute as would the Florida Supreme Court. Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983). To obtain jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant consistent with Florida's long-arm statute, Fla Stat. § 48.193 , a plaintiff must allege specific, ultimate facts that bring the action within the ambit of the applicable long-arm statute.See John Posey Corp. v. R.J.T. Engineering, Inc., 617 So.2d 441, 443 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Miller v. Braunstein, 549 So.2d 797 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). Plaintiffs bear the burden of alleging sufficient facts to establish the application of the long-arm statute. See Taylor Forge International, Inc. v. Specialty Maintenance Construction, Inc., 685 So.2d 1360, 1361 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1996).

Case No.:  6:12-cv-51-Orl-28KRS (M.D. Fla. May. 4, 2012)

Florida's long-arm statute provides that "[a]ny person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent" commits a tortious act within this state "thereby submits himself or herself . . . to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action arising from" the tortious act. § 48.193(1), Fla. Stat. "[T]he reach of the Florida long-arm statute is a question of Florida state law," and therefore this Court is "required to construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court." Oriental Imps. & Exps., Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted).

Case No.: 471 F. Supp. 2d 1292 (S.D. Fla. 2007)

2. In a diversity action, a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only to the extent permitted by the long-arm statute of the forum state. See Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890 (11th Cir. 1983). The Florida long-arm statute, Fla. Stat. § 48.193, is strictly construed and the party invoking jurisdiction has the burden of pleading and proving facts which clearly justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Id.; see also Miami Breakers, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1325 at 1328 ("If a plaintiff alleges personal jurisdiction, then it bears the initial burden of pleading facts to support personal jurisdiction over the defendant in its complaint.

Case No.:. 5:13-cv-75-Oc-10PRL (M.D. Fla. Sep. 16, 2013)

A federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction undertakes a two-step inquiry in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists: the exercise of jurisdiction must (1) be appropriate under the state long-arm statute and (2) not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. United Technologies Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009); Horizon Aggressive Growth, L.P. v. Rothstein-Kass, P.A., 421 F.3d 1162, 1166 (11th Cir. 2005). See also Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1989) (stating the proper test for personal jurisdiction under Florida law). Federal courts are required to construe the Florida long-arm statute as would the Florida Supreme Court. Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983).

Case No.:  8:19-cv-2523-T-60AAS (M.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2021)

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges the Court has personal jurisdiction over XenCall because it "assists its customers, including Bay Area in this district, make automated telemarketing calls." (Doc. 41 at ¶ 11). XenCall rebuts this allegation - and attests via affidavit - that it never entered into a contract, licensed telemarketing software, or entered into any business agreement with Bay Area. See (Doc. 78-1). This same affidavit also states that XenCall does not have an office in Florida, nor does it have a license to conduct business in Florida. All this information submitted in XenCall's affidavit has been unanswered by Plaintiff. As "Florida's long-arm statute is to be strictly construed" and Plaintiff bears the burden of proving personal jurisdiction, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to meet this burden here. Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 891 (11th Cir. 1983).

Case No.: 924 F.2d 215 (11th Cir. 1991) 

The proper interpretation of the Act is a question of Florida law. Therefore, federal courts are required to construe the Act as would the Supreme Court of Florida. Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990); Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro and Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983). We begin with an examination of the statutory scheme, and then proceed to a review of the relevant case law.

CASE NO. 16-80097-CIV-KAM (S.D. Fla. Sep. 30, 2016) 

Florida law determines the application of the Florida long-arm statute. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1352 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009)). The Court is required to apply the statute as the Supreme Court of Florida would and "adhere to the interpretations of [the statute] offered by Florida's District Courts of Appeal absent some indication that the Florida Supreme Court would hold otherwise." Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A., 736 F.3d at 1352 (citing Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir. 1996)). "The Florida long-arm statute is strictly construed". Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 891 (11th Cir. 1983)

Case No. 14-20914-Civ-COOKE/TORRES (S.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2015)   Cited 2 times

In a diversity action, a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants only to the extent permitted by the forum state's long-arm statute. Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890 (11th Cir. 1983). Plaintiff bears the burden to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Stubbs v. Wyndham Nassau Resort & Crystal Palace Casino, 447 F.3d 1357, 1360 (11th Cir. 2006). When a defendant submits affidavits challenging a court's jurisdiction, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence supporting jurisdiction, unless the defense affidavits contain only conclusory assertions. Id. Where the plaintiff and defendant submit conflicting evidence and affidavits the court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id. However, the Court may make factual findings necessary to resolve motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1376 (11th Cir. 2008).

Case No.: 750 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1985)

This court generally evaluates a jurisdictional problem by looking first at the applicable state statute and then at federal due process requirements. In diversity cases such as this one, "the federal court is bound by state law concerning the amenability of a person or a corporation to suit, so long as state law does not exceed the limitations imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Washington v. Norton Manufacturing, Inc., 588 F.2d 441, 444 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942, 99 S.Ct. 2886, 61 L.Ed.2d 313 (1979); see Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, 701 F.2d 889, 890 (11th Cir. 1983); Rubaii v. Lakewood Pipe of Texas, Inc., 695 F.2d 541, 543 (11th Cir. 1983).

CASE NO. 06-22862-CIV-GOLD/TURNOFF (S.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2008)

In a diversity action such as this case, "a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only to the extent permitted by the long-arm statute of the forum state." Rexam Airspray, Inc. v. Arminak, 471 F.Supp. 2d 1292, 1297-98 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (citing Oriental Imps, and Exps., Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890 (11th Cir. 1983)). Under the law of this Circuit, a district court must conduct a two-part inquiry when deciding an issue of personal jurisdiction. Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 626 (11th Cir. 1996)); Laux v. Carnival Corp., 470 F.Supp 2d 1379, 1381 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (citing Sculptchair, 94 F.3d at 626). First, I must determine whether the Florida long-arm statute is satisfied. Future Tech., 218 F.3d at 1249; Sculptchair, 94 F.3d at 626; Kin Yong Lung Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Temple, 816 So. 2d 663, 665-666 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Second, I must determine whether there are sufficient minimum contacts between Defendants and the state of Florida so as to satisfy traditional notions of fair play and substantial…

Case No.: 772 F. Supp. 1258 (S.D. Fla. 1991)

The Florida long-arm statute is to be strictly construed to guarantee compliance with due process requirements. Cosmopolitan Health Spa v. Health Industries, Inc., 362 So.2d 367 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro and Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889 (11th Cir. 1983). The reach of the Florida long-arm statute is a question of Florida law, so a federal court is required to construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court. Madara, 916 F.2d at 1514. However, federal court construction of state law may be relied upon in the absence of supervening state court interpretations. Spencer Boat Co. v. Liutermoza, 498 F.2d 332 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 503 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1974).

Case No.: 2:22-cv-00486-RDP (N.D. Ala. Dec. 15, 2022)

Federal courts are required to construe the Alabama long-arm statute the same way the Supreme Court of Alabama would. See Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983). Alabama's long-arm statute permits personal jurisdiction to the extent it “is not inconsistent with the [Alabama Constitution] or the Constitution of the United States.” Ala. R. Civ. P. 4.2(b). Thus, the question here is whether assertion of personal jurisdiction over Defendants comports with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Olivier v. Merritt Dredging Co., 979 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Alabama Waterproofing Co., Inc. v. Hanby, 431 So.2d 141, 145 (Ala. 1983)).

Case No.: 22-81372-CIV-CANNON/McCabe (S.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2023)

“Because federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons, a federal court sitting in Florida must conduct a two-step inquiry to determine whether it has personal jurisdiction over [a] non-resident defendant.” Atmos Nation LLC v. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., No. 15-CV-62104, 2016 WL 1028332, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2016) (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 753 (2014)). Specifically, a federal court sitting in Florida must consider (1) whether personal jurisdiction exists over the non-resident defendant under Florida's long-arm statute, and (2) whether the exercise of that jurisdiction would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1350 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Mutual Serv. Ins. Co. v. Frit Indus., Inc., 358 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2004)). Florida's long-arm statute is to be strictly construed, and Petitioners bear the burden of proving personal jurisdiction. See generally Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir. 1996); Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro 

Case No.: 161 F. Supp. 2d 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)

Under Florida law, personal jurisdiction is established if plaintiff satisfies the requirements of Florida's long-arm statute, Fl. Stat. Ann. § 48.193, and the constitutional due process requirement of minimum contacts with the state of Florida, see d eMco Techs., Inc. v. C.S. Engineered Castings, Inc., 769 So.2d 1128, 1129-30 (Fla.App. 2000). "[J]urisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute requires greater activities or contacts than those demanded by the due process clause [of the United States Constitution]." Lauzon v. Joseph Ribkoff, Inc., 77 F. Supp.2d 1250, 1253, 1255 (S.D.Fla. 1999) (noting that Florida long-arm statute is strictly construed and that "Florida courts require substantial proof before extending in personam jurisdiction over non-resident defendants"). Plaintiffs allege that the Ulstein Propeller's contacts with Florida satisfy sections (1)(a), (b), and (f)(1) of the Florida long-arm statute which provide that jurisdiction is satisfied if "the defendant[s] 'engage in' or 'carry on' a business or business venture in the state, commit a tortious act in the state, or engage in solicitation or service activities within the state." Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. 

Case No.: Case No: 3:12-cv-193-J-37TEM (M.D. Fla. Sep. 17, 2012) 

This Court examines the Florida's long-arm statute as would the Florida Supreme Court because the reach of the statute is a question of state law. See Oriental Imps. & Exps., Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983). The Court must strictly construe the long-arm statute. Id. at 891.

Case No.: 723 F. Supp. 1197 (E.D. Mich. 1989)

In Mohney, a Michigan district court dismissed the first count in an indictment alleging conspiracy to defraud the government because the government's accusation in the count was essentially a charge that defendants conspired to violate 26 U.S.C. § 7206, and therefore, under Minarik the conspiracy had to be charged under the offense clause of the conspiracy statute.

Caribbean Films Maduro Curiel's Bank Distributing, N.V. N.V. Curacao, N.A.

CASE NO. 8:18-cv-1409-T-23CPT (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2019)

Florida's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident such as VLG must accord with Florida's long-arm statute and with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So.2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989). Under Section 48.193(1)(a)(2), Florida Statutes, a non-resident submits to personal jurisdiction in Florida by "[c]ommitting a tortious act within [Florida]." Trademark infringement is a tortious act under the long-arm statute. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1353 (11th Cir. 2013). "Because the reach of the Florida long-arm statute is a question of Florida state law, federal courts are required to construe [the long-arm statute] as would the Florida Supreme Court." Oriental Imps. & Exps, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983)

Case No.: 369 F. Supp. 3d 1241 (M.D. Fla. 2019)

Florida's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident such as VLG must accord with Florida's long-arm statute and with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais , 554 So.2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989). Under Section 48.193(1)(a)(2), Florida Statutes, a non-resident submits to personal jurisdiction in Florida by "[c]ommitting a tortious act within [Florida]." Trademark infringement is a tortious act under the long-arm statute. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri , 736 F.3d 1339, 1353 (11th Cir. 2013). "Because the reach of the Florida long-arm statute is a question of Florida state law, federal courts are required to construe [the long-arm statute] as would the Florida Supreme Court." Oriental Imps. & Exps., Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V. , 701 F.2d 889, 890–91 (11th Cir. 1983).

CASE NO. 12-Civ-23364-COOKE/TURNOFF (S.D. Fla. Sep. 30, 2013)

Although Plaintiffs fail to specifically cite to Florida's long-arm statute in their Complaint, the parties agree that I may only exercise personal jurisdiction over HAI to the extent permitted by Florida's long-arm statute. Mot. to Dismiss 5; Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss 6; see also Cable/Home Comm'n Corp., 902 F.2d at 855; Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890 (11th Cir. 1983). Florida's long-arm statute must be strictly construed. Fraser v. Smith, 594 F.3d 842, 848 n.8 (11th Cir. 2010) ("Florida's long-arm statute is to be strictly construed because the extent of the long-arm statute is governed by Florida law, federal courts are required to construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court.") (internal citations and quotations omitted)

Case No.: 36 F. Supp. 3d 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2014)

In analyzing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), the court must: (1) determine whether the forum state's long arm statute provides a basis for jurisdiction; and (2) determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process. Abramson v. Walt Disney Co., 132 Fed.Appx. 273, 275 (11th Cir.2005) (citing Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir.1990)). Because the reach of Florida's long arm statute is a question of state law, the court must construe the statute as would the Florida Supreme Court. Id. (citing Madara, 916 F.2d at 1514). Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit has noted that the statute should be strictly construed. See Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, 701 F.2d 889, 891 (11th Cir.1983) (internal citations omitted)

Case No.: 2:14-cv-610-JHH (N.D. Ala. Jul. 30, 2014)

The reach of the Alabama long-arm statute is a matter of Alabama law. Federal courts are required to construe it as would the Alabama Supreme Court. See Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-891 (11th Cir. 1983). Alabama's long-arm statute permits personal jurisdiction to the extent it "is not inconsistent with the constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States." ALA. R. CIV. P. 4.2(b). Thus, the question here is whether assertion of personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants comports with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Olivier v. Merritt Dredging Co., Inc., 979 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Alabama Waterproofing Co., Inc. v. Hanby, 431 So.2d 141, 145 (Ala. 1983)). Compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause exists where the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, and where the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Olivier, 979 F.2d at 830-831; Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1516 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316

Case No.: 532 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (M.D. Fla. 2007

The determination of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant has two parts: (1) whether the forum state's long-arm statute provides a basis for personal jurisdiction, and (2) whether sufficient minimum contacts exist between the defendant and the forum state to satisfy traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Sculptchair, 94 F.3d at 626; see also Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890 (11th Cir. 1983) ("a federal court in a diversity action may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only to the extent permitted by the long-arm statute of the forum state."). "Only if both prongs of the analysis are satisfied, may a federal or state court exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant." Madara, 916 F.2d at 1514. Further, because the long-arm statute is Florida state law, "federal courts are required to construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court." Sculptchair, 94 F.3d at 627; Madara, 916 F.2d at 1514 (internal citations omitted). "The Florida long-arm statute is strictly construed." Oriental Imports Exports, Inc., 701

Case No. 01-830-CIV-KING (S.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2002)

64. Initially, the CARIBBEAN MERCANTILE BANK REFUSED to pay MAI's invoices because the bank had some concern over whether the formal conditions of the GOA's Bank Guarantee No. 956 (issued by Caribbean Mercantile Bank as the guarantor for Motorsports America, Inc. as the beneficiary) had been fulfilled. (6/4 Tr.Trans. at 92). When confronted with this serious problem, Finance Minister TICO CROES and Prime Minister EMAN telephoned the Chairman of the Board of the MADURO CURIEL'S , Mr. LIONEL CAPRILES, at his home in Curacao. Mr. CAPRILES, Chairman of the MADURO CURIELS BANK that owned 100% of the SHARES of the CARIBBEAN MERCANTILE BANK received two phone calls from Finance Minister Tico Croes and Prime Minister Eman after 9:30 p.m. on August 13, 1999. (6/4 Tr. Trans. at 93; 5/24 Tr.Trans. at 57-59). Mr. Capriles was familiar with the Bank Guarantee No. 965 that had been issued by his subordinate bank, the Caribbean Mercantile Bank in Aruba. He testified that when Prime Minister Eman came on the phone to demand that the funds be immediately released to MAI, the Prime Minister told him "there

Case No. : 216 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (S.D. Fla. 2002)  

64. Initially, the Caribbean Mercantile Bank refused to pay MAI's invoices because the bank had some concern over whether the formal conditions of the GOA's Bank Guarantee No. 956 (issued by Caribbean Mercantile Bank as the guarantor for Motorsports America, Inc. as the beneficiary) had been fulfilled. (6/4 Tr. Trans. at 92). When confronted with this serious problem, Finance Minister Tico Croes and Prime Minister Eman telephoned the Chairman of the Board of the Maduro Curiels Bank, Mr. Lionel Capriles, at his home in Curacao. Mr. Capriles, Chairman of the Maduro Curiels Bank that owned 100% of the shares of the Caribbean Mercantile Bank received two phone calls from Finance Minister Tico Croes and Prime Minister Eman after 9:30 p.m. on August 13, 1999. (6/4 Tr. Trans. at 93; 5/24 Tr.Trans. at 57-59). Mr. Capriles was familiar with the Bank Guarantee No. 965 that had been issued by his subordinate bank, the Caribbean Mercantile Bank in Aruba. He testified that when Prime Minister Eman came on the phone to demand that the funds be immediately released to MAI, the Prime Minister told him "there are omissions. We are in a desperate hurry to do this. You

Case No. : 205 B.R. 987 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1997)

There is no dispute regarding the final five elements. First, the County is a creditor in this case and clearly benefitted from the transfers. Second, the transfers were on account of over two million ($2,000,000) that the Debtor owed the County for its prior operation at the Port of Miami. The County does not dispute that at the time the transfers were made the Debtor was insolvent.

Avoiding preferential transfers received indirectly from the buyer of a debtor's assets is not a novel concept. Other courts have reached the same result where those transfers are for the benefit of the debtor or result in the diminution of the debtor's estate. See Buckley v. Jeld-Wen (In re Interior Wood Prods. Co.), 986 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1993); See also Taunt v. Fidelity Bank (In re Royal Golf Prods. Corp.) 908 F.2d 91, 94 (6th Cir. 1990) (third party payments are voidable to the extent that the debtor pledged its property as security for these payments and thus depleted its estate); Sommers v. Burton (In re Conard Corporation), 806 F.2d 610 (5th Cir. 1986) (assumption of debt by purchaser as part of sales price constituted avoidable transfer).

On January 30, 1995, an Escrow Agreement was executed by I.T.O., the Debtor, Maduro Holding N.V. (The Debtor's parent company), and Armstrong Mejer (the Escrow Agent). Trustee's Exhibit D. Schedule A of the Escrow Agreement designates the County as one of the creditors to be paid from the monies deposited into the Escrow Account. Trustee's Exhibit D.

Case No. 09-34791-BKC-RBR (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Jun. 4, 2010)

According to long standing principle, general creditors have no right to have their claims paid out of property or its proceeds that have never actually belonged to the insolvent trustee, if the property in question can be sufficiently identified or traced as to justify its separation from the corpus of the trustee's estate. Myers v. Matusek, 98 Fla. 1126, 1143 (Fla. 1929); In re First Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 36 B.R. 508, 510 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983). Trust funds must be strictly traceable to particular property that is capable of clear identification. In re First Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 36 B.R. at 510. Similarly, under Florida receivership law, where "the deposit is in the form of cash, and was made shortly before the bank went into the hands of the receiver, and the cash on hand was, at all times after the deposit was made, equal to or more than the amount of the deposit, all the courts agree that the depositor should have a preference over the general creditors". Myers v. Matusek, 96 Fla. at 1137-38.

PAGE 7

Moreover, under Florida law, "legal title to the property placed in an escrow account remains with the grantor until the occurrence of the condition specified in the escrow agreement." Dzikowski, 239 F.3d at 1197-98 (quoting Dickerson v. Central Fla. Radiation Oncology Group, 225 B.R. 241, 244 (Bankr M.D. Fla. 1998)). Thus, "funds that are deposited into an escrow account by a debtor, for the benefit of others, cannot be characterized as property of the estate." Dzikowski, 239 F.3d at 1198 (quoting In re S.E.L Maduro, 205 B.R. 987, 990-91 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1997)).

No. 97-83543, Adv. No. 99-8168, No. 97-83541, Adv. No. 99-8169 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Sep. 10, 2001)

Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth five elements which must be met in order for a trustee to avoid certain transfers made before the filing of the bankruptcy. A transfer is preferential if it is (1) to a creditor, (2) on account of a pre-existing debt, (3) made while the debtor is insolvent, (4) made on or within 90 days before the date of filing the petition, or made between 90 days and one year before the date of filing the petition if the creditor was an insider who had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent, and which (5) enables the creditor to receive more than he would receive if the estate were liquidated under Chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).

The portion of the monthly payments relating to the debt owed by Seller to First of America Bank shall be paid directly by Purchaser to First of America Bank, with the balance of the monthly payment being paid by Purchaser to Kevin J. Davlin.

Though not cited by the TRUSTEE, the court in In re S.E.L. Maduro (Florida), Inc., 205 B.R. 987 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. 1997), following the court's decision in Interior Wood, rejected a similar contention to that made here by DAVLIN, that the transfers by the purchaser of the debtor's assets to certain unsecured creditors were not preferential because the purchaser's ability to designate the unsecured creditors to be paid as part of the purchase transaction was a condition of the purchase and resulted in a higher price for the debtor's assets, explaining:

Case No.: 216 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (S.D. Fla. 2002)

64. Initially, the Caribbean Mercantile Bank refused to pay MAI's invoices because the bank had some concern over whether the formal conditions of the GOA's Bank Guarantee No. 956 (issued by Caribbean Mercantile Bank as the guarantor for Motorsports America, Inc. as the beneficiary) had been fulfilled. (6/4 Tr. Trans. at 92). When confronted with this serious problem, Finance Minister Tico Croes and Prime Minister Eman telephoned the Chairman of the Board of the Maduro Curiels Bank, Mr. Lionel Capriles, at his home in Curacao. Mr. Capriles, Chairman of the Maduro Curiels Bank that owned 100% of the shares of the Caribbean Mercantile Bank received two phone calls from Finance Minister Tico Croes and Prime Minister Eman after 9:30 p.m. on August 13, 1999. (6/4 Tr. Trans. at 93; 5/24 Tr.Trans. at 57-59). Mr. Capriles was familiar with the Bank Guarantee No. 965 that had been issued by his subordinate bank, the Caribbean Mercantile Bank in Aruba. He testified that when Prime Minister Eman came on the phone to demand that the funds be immediately released to MAI, the Prime Minister told him…

Case No.: 4:14-cv-00998-SGC (N.D. Ala. Mar. 26, 2015)

The reach of the Alabama long-arm statute is a matter of Alabama law. Federal courts are required to construe it as would the Supreme Court of Alabama. Giraldo v. Drummond Co., Inc., No. 09-1041-RDP, 2012 WL 2358306, *3 (N.D. Ala., June 20, 2012); see Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-891 (11th Cir.1983). Alabama's long-arm statute permits personal jurisdiction to the extent it "is not inconsistent with the constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States." ALA. R. CIV. P. 4.2(b). Thus, the real question here is whether assertion of personal jurisdiction over Standard Metals comports with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Olivier v. Merritt Dredging Co., Inc., 979 F.2d 827, 830 (11th Cir.1992) (citing Alabama Waterproofing Co., Inc. v. Hanby, 431 So.2d 141, 145 (Ala.1983)). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is satisfied where the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state and where the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 830-831.

Case No.: 102 F. Supp. 3d 1264 (M.D. Fla. 2015)

678 Where, as here, “jurisdiction is based on a federal question arising under a statute that is silent regarding service of process, Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure directs us to look to the state long-arm statute in order to determine the existence of personal jurisdiction.” Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 626–27 (11th Cir.1996). Florida's long-arm statute is codified at section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes; its interpretation “ ‘is a question of Florida law,’ and this Court is required to apply the statute ‘as would the Florida Supreme Court.’ ” Louis Vuitton, 736 F.3d at 1352 (quoting United Techs., 556 F.3d at 1274). Florida's long-arm statute is to be strictly construed. Oriental Imps. & Exps., Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 891 (11th Cir.1983) (interpreting Florida law).

Case No.: 8:21-cv-1852-WFJ-CPT (M.D. Fla. Jun. 23, 2022)

“[U]nder Florida law, a nonresident defendant commits ‘a tortious act within [Florida]' when he commits an act outside the state that causes injury within Florida.” Louis Vuitton, 736 F.3d at 1353 (emphasis in original) (quoting Lovelady, 544 F.3d at 1283). The physical location in which a foreign defendant creates a website and posts allegedly infringing material is not relevant. Id. at 1354. Instead, the issue is whether that defendant's tortious acts concerning a website caused injury in Florida. Id. In considering this question, the Court is required to construe Florida's long-arm statute as understood by the Florida Supreme Court. Oriental Imps. & Exps., Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983).

Case No.: 474 F. Supp. 3d 1260 (S.D. Fla. 2020) 

"Since the extent of the long-arm statute is governed by Florida law, ‘federal courts are required to construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court.’ " Cable/Home Commc'n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc. , 902 F.2d 829, 856 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V. , 701 F.2d 889, 890–91 (11th Cir. 1983) ). "Absent some indication that the Florida Supreme Court would hold otherwise, [federal courts] are bound to adhere to decisions of [Florida's] intermediate courts." Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd. , 94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir. 1996) (alterations added; citation omitted). Florida courts "strictly construe the long-arm statute in favor of the nonresident defendant." Abdo v. Abdo , 263 So. 3d 141, 145 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (citations omitted).

Case No. 1:12-cv-21328-KMM (S.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2013)

"Because the reach of the Florida long-arm statute is a question of Florida state law, federal courts are required to construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court." Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing Moore v. Lindsey, 662 F.2d 354, 357-58 (5th Cir. 1981); Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1232 (5th Cir. 1973)). Furthermore, the Florida long-arm statute is to be strictly construed. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving personal jurisdiction. Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir. 1996).

Case No.: 650 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (S.D. Fla. 2009)

§ 48.193(1)(b), Fla. Stat. "Because the reach of the Florida long-arm statute is a question of Florida state law, federal courts are required to construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court." Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing Moore v. Lindsey, 662 F.2d 354, 357-58 (5th Cir. 1981). Furthermore, the Florida long-arm statute is to be strictly construed. Id. at 891.

Case No.: 692 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2012)

Likewise, defendants' correspondent banking relationships show that they are not “essentially at home” in the United States. That is precisely why correspondent banking relationships are needed and used. “Interbank accounts, also known as correspondent accounts, are used by foreign banks to offer services to their customers in jurisdictions where the banks have no physical presence....” United States v. Union Bank for Sav. & Inv. (Jordan), 487 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir.2007) (emphasis added). Accordingly, many courts have soundly rejected the suggestion that a correspondent banking relationship with a bank in the forum is sufficient to support general jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. See Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 891–92 (11th Cir.1983) (holding correspondent banking relationships not enough to support general jurisdiction over nonresident defendant under Florida long-arm statute); Tamam v. Fransabank Sal, 677 F.Supp.2d 720, 731–33 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (maintenance of correspondent accounts in New York insufficient to support exercise of general jurisdiction in the U.S. pursuan

Case No.: 126 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (S.D. Fla. 2000)

MeterLogic seeks to establish the court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the diversity statute. A federal court sitting in diversity may only exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the extent permitted by the forum state's long arm statute and if the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the requirements of due process. See Vermeulen v. Renault U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1552 (11th Cir. 1993). Because the reach of Florida's long arm statute is a question of Florida law, federal courts are required to construe the long arm statute as would the Florida Supreme Court. See Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890 (11th Cir. 1983); Lauzon v. Joseph Ribkoff, Inc., 77 F. Supp.2d 1250, 1253 (S.D.Fla. 1999).

Case No. 6:13-cv-1062-Orl-37TBS (M.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 2013)

This Court examines Florida's long-arm statute as would the Florida Supreme Court, and strictly construes the statute. See Oriental Imps. & Exps., Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F. 2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983). Florida's long-arm statute provides for both specific jurisdiction conferred by § 48.193(1) and general jurisdiction conferred by § 48.193(2). Miller v. Berman, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1334 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (citing Nw. Aircraft Capital Corp. v. Stewart, 842 So. 2d 190, 193 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)). The provision conferring general jurisdiction provides: "[a] defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within [Florida], whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of [Florida], whether or not the claim arises from that activity." Fla. Stat. § 48.193(2). The provisions conferring specific jurisdiction provide:

Case No.: 2:09-CV-1041-RDP (N.D. Ala. Jun. 20, 2012) 

The reach of the Alabama long-arm statute is a matter of Alabama law. Federal courts are required to construe it as would the Supreme Court of Alabama. See Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-891 (11th Cir. 1983). Alabama's long-arm statute permits personal jurisdiction to the extent it "is not inconsistent with the constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States." ALA. R. CIV. P. 4.2(b). Thus, the real question here is whether assertion of personal jurisdiction over Adkins comports with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Olivier v. Merritt Dredging Co., Inc., 979 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Alabama Waterproofing Co., Inc. v. Hanby, 431 So.2d 141, 145 (Ala. 1983)). Compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause exists where the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, and where the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Olivier, 979 F.2d at 830-831; Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1516 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).

Case No.: 8:21-cv-0210-KKM-AEP (M.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2021)

"Because the reach of the Florida long-arm statute is a question of Florida state law, federal courts are required to construe [the long-arm statute] as would the Florida Supreme Court." Oriental Imps. & Exps., Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983). Applying state law, the Court concludes that Moccio satisfies Florida's long-arm statute by showing "sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the action within the ambit of [Florida's long-arm statute]." Internet Sols. Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So.3d 1201, 1207 (Fla. 2010) (quotation omitted).

Case No. 99-7131-CIV-GOLD/SIMONTON (S.D. Fla. Aug. 26, 1999)

MeterLogic seeks to establish the court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the diversity statute. A federal court sitting in diversity may only exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the extent permitted by the forum state's long arm statute and if the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the requirements of due process. See Vermeulen v. Renault U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1552 (11th Cir. 1993). Because the reach of Florida's long arm statute is a question of Florida law, federal courts are required to construe the long arm statute as would the Florida Supreme Court. See Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890 (11th Cir. 1983); Lauzon v. Joseph Ribkoff Inc., 77 F. Supp.2d 1250, 1253 (S.D. Fla. 1999).

CASE NO. 99-7131-CIV-GOLD/SIMONTON (S.D. Fla. Sep. 27, 2000)

MeterLogic seeks to establish the court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the diversity statute. A federal court sitting in diversity may only exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the extent permitted by the forum state's long arm statute and if the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the requirements of due process. See Vermeulen v. Renault U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1552 (11th Cir. 1993). Because the reach of Florida's long arm statute is a question of Florida law, federal courts are required to construe the long arm statute as would the Florida Supreme Court. See Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890 (11th Cir. 1983); Lauzon v. Joseph Ribkoff, Inc., 77 F. Supp.2d 1250, 1253 (S.D. Fla. 1999).

Case No. 8:17-cv-1840-T-17CPT (M.D. Fla. Sep. 10, 2019)

The reach of the long-arm statute is "a question of Florida law," Mazer, 556 F.3d at 1274-75 (internal quotation omitted), and is to be strictly construed, Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). Accordingly, any doubts with respect to the statute's applicability must be resolved in favor of the nonresident defendant. Lindenau v. Lundeen, 2018 WL 1152403, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2018) (citing Gadea v. Star Cruises, Ltd., 949 So. 2d 1143, 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)).

Case No.: 902 F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990)

Since the extent of the long-arm statute is governed by Florida law, "federal courts are required to construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court." Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983). The Florida Supreme Court has explicated section 48.193, explaining that complying with the long-arm statute and determining federal constitutional minimum contacts are discrete analyses:

Case No.: 184 F. Supp. 2d 1246 (S.D. Fla. 2001)

The reach of the Florida long-arm statute is a question of Florida law, and this Court must therefore apply state law. Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983). The Court may also rely on federal construction of state law, in the absence of supervening state court decisions requiring a different interpretation. Spencer Boat Co. v. Liutermoza, 498 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1974). Construing Florida law, this Court has previously held that a negligence action for personal injuries sustained at a hotel while vacationing in another country does not "arise from" the simple act of making a reservation by calling the hotel's reservations office in Florida. Limardo v. Corporation Intercontinental, 590 F. Supp. 1109, 1111 (S.D. Fla. 1984).

Case No.: 2:23-cv-00408-RDP (N.D. Ala. Sep. 1, 2023)

Federal courts are required to construe the Alabama long-arm statute the same way the Supreme Court of Alabama would. See Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983). Alabama's long-arm statute permits personal jurisdiction to the extent it “is not inconsistent with the [Alabama Constitution] or the Constitution of the United States.” Ala. R. Civ. P. 4.2(b). Thus, the question here is whether assertion of personal jurisdiction over Defendants comports with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Olivier v. Merritt Dredging Co., 979 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Alabama Waterproofing Co., Inc. v. Hanby, 431 So.2d 141, 145 (Ala. 1983)).

Case No.: 77 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (S.D. Fla. 1999)

This Court turns first to the state's long-arm statute. The reach of the Florida long-arm statute is a question of Florida law, thus, the court must construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court. Madara, 916 F.2d at 1514; Cable/Home Communication, 902 F.2d at 856. Florida's long-arm statute "is strictly construed, and the person invoking jurisdiction under it has the burden of proving facts which clearly justify the use of this method of service of process." Oriental Imports Exports v. Maduro Curiel's, 701 F.2d 889, 891 (11th cir. 1983) (citing Bank of Wessington v. Winters Gov't Securities Corp., 361 So.2d 757, 759 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Elmex Corp. v. Atlantic Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 325 So.2d 58, 61 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)).

Case No.: 173 F.R.D. 689 (M.D. Fla. 1997)

The Court must examine the Florida long-arm statute as would the Florida Supreme Court, because the reach of the statute is a question of state law. Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir.1983). Florida's long-arm statute must be strictly construed and the burden of proving facts which satisfy the criteria is on the plaintiff. Id. at 891.Florida Statute Section 48.193 provides, in pertinent part:

Case No.: 521 F. Supp. 3d 1197 (M.D. Fla. 2021) 

Zimmerman alleges claims for defamation generally, defamation by implication, and defamation per se. Defendants contend that they are not subject to the jurisdiction of Florida courts. They also assert various grounds on which the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice, for failing to state a claim on which relief can be granted. "As a general rule, courts should address issues relating to personal jurisdiction before reaching the merits of a plaintiff's claims." Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A. , 119 F.3d 935, 940 (11th Cir. 1997) ; Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V. , 701 F.2d 889, 890 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Since the district court was without in personam jurisdiction, we do not reach the merits of the negligence issue or the cross-appeal."). Before the Court addresses these issues raised in the motion to dismiss, it will address, sua sponte , Zimmerman's failure to comply with Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which transforms the complaint into a shotgun pleading and subjects it to dismissal

CASE NO.:15-CV-80310-KAM (S.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2016) 

As to the Colonial Bank subpoena, Klayman cannot assert any injury caused by Defendants' alleged misconduct. Klayman alleges that Defendants failed to serve him with the subpoena, thus failing to give him notice and an opportunity to respond while Colonial Bank was "induced fraudulently and illegally into believing that the release of Plaintiff's financial information was proper and without objection." (DE 1 ¶¶ 41-43.) The Court takes judicial notice of the Ohio state court's order denying Klayman's motion to quash the Colonial Bank subpoena. (DE 15-2.) Given that the court rejected Klayman's objections to the subpoena once he had notice, Defendants' alleged misconduct in not providing sufficient notice could not have caused Klayman's alleged injuries. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (providing a cause of action to "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter") (emphasis added); Williams, 465 F.3d at 1287 ("The 'by reason of' requirement implicates two concepts: (1) a sufficiently direct injury so that a plaintiff has standing to sue; and (2) proximate cause.").

Case No. 3:04cv427/MCR/EMT (N.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2005) 

Florida's long-arm statute is to be strictly construed.Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 891 (11th Cir. 1983))

Case No.: 753 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 2014)

b. Products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use. § 48.193. “Florida's long-arm statute is to be strictly construed,” Sculptchair Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir.1996) ( citing Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 891 (11th Cir.1983)), and some courts interpreting Florida's statute have noted that it “confers less jurisdiction upon Florida courts than allowed by the Due Process Clause.” Am. Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Webb Life Ins. Agency, Inc., 876 F.Supp. 1278, 1280 (S.D.Fla.1995); see also McRae v. J.D./M.D., Inc., 511 So.2d 540, 543 n. 4 (Fla.1987) (“It has been held by other courts that our long arm statute requires more activities or contacts than is mandated by the constitution.” (citing Mallard v. Aluminum Co. of Canada, Ltd., 634 F.2d 236, 241 (5th Cir.1981))).

Case No.: 2:23-cv-00408-RDP (N.D. Ala. Jun. 30, 2023)

Federal courts are required to construe the Alabama long-arm statute the same way the Supreme Court of Alabama would. See Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983). Alabama's long-arm statute permits personal jurisdiction to the extent it “is not inconsistent with the [Alabama Constitution] or the Constitution of the United States.” Ala. R. Civ. P. 4.2(b). Thus, the question here is whether assertion of personal jurisdiction over Defendants comports with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Olivier v. Merritt Dredging Co., 979 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Alabama Waterproofing Co., Inc. v. Hanby, 431 So.2d 141, 145 (Ala. 1983)).

Case No.: 2:15-cv-506-RDP (N.D. Ala. Aug. 1, 2017)

The reach of the Alabama long-arm statute is interpreted according to Alabama law. Federal courts are required to construe the statute as would the Supreme Court of Alabama. See Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-891 (11th Cir. 1983). Alabama has made clear that its long-arm statute permits personal jurisdiction to the extent it "is not inconsistent with the constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States." Ala.R.Civ.P.. 4.2(b). Thus, the question here is whether assertion of personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants comports with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Olivier v. Merritt Dredging Co., Inc., 979 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Alabama Waterproofing Co., Inc. v. Hanby, 431 So.2d 141, 145 (Ala. 1983)). The requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause are met where the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, and where the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Olivier, 979 F.2d at 830-831; Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1516 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting

Case No.: 699 F. Supp. 1547 (S.D. Fla. 1988) 

In a diversity action, a federal district court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only to the extent permitted by the long-arm statute of the forum state. See Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro and Curiel's, 701 F.2d 889, 890 (11th Cir. 1983). Of course, a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant pursuant to any statute could never offend the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction must comply with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). The court finds that the exercise personal jurisdiction here is permitted by the Florida Long-Arm Statute and does not offend the due process clause.

PAGE 1549

The Horizon Financial Corporation has filed two motions to dismiss. Both the motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint and the motion to dismiss the crossclaim of Fernandez present a complexing personal jurisdiction problem: Whether a non-resident bank establishes minimum contacts with the forum by entering into a mortgage repurchase agreement with a resident bank and other non-resident banks. After conducting a thorough review of the entire record, the court finds that Horizon has minimum contacts with the State of Florida such that the court's exercise of jurisdiction here will not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."

Case No.: 944 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D. Fla. 1996)

Fla.Stat. § 76.04. However, "[b]ecause of the extraordinary nature of attachment proceedings, the terms of the statute must be narrowly construed." Cerna v. Swiss Bank Corp., 503 So.2d 1297 (Fla. 3d Dist.Ct.App. 1987).

Case No. 19-cv-62412-BLOOM/Valle (S.D. Fla. Jun. 10, 2020)

Additionally, because "the extent of the long-arm statute is governed by Florida law, 'federal courts are required to construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court.'" Cable/Home Commc'n Corp., 902 F.2d at 856 (quoting Oriental Imps. & Exps., Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983)). "Absent some indication that the Florida Supreme Court would hold otherwise, [federal courts] are bound to adhere to decisions of its intermediate courts." Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Polskie Linie Oceaniczne, 795 F.2d at 970). "[T]he long-arm statute must be strictly construed, and any doubts about the applicability of the statute are resolved in favor of the defendant and against a conclusion that personal jurisdiction exists." Gadea v. Star Cruises, Ltd., 949 So. 2d 1143, 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (citing Seabra v. Int'l Specialty Imp., Inc., 869 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004))

Case No. 19-cv-22241-BLOOM/Louis (S.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2020)

Additionally, because "the extent of the long-arm statute is governed by Florida law, 'federal courts are required to construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court.'" Cable/Home Commc'n Corp., 902 F.2d at 856 (quoting Oriental Imps. & Exps., Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983)). "Absent some indication that the Florida Supreme Court would hold otherwise, [federal courts] are bound to adhere to decisions of its intermediate courts." Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Polskie Linie Oceaniczne, 795 F.2d at 970). "[T]he long-arm statute must be strictly construed, and any doubts about the applicability of the statute are resolved in favor of the defendant and against a conclusion that personal jurisdiction exists." Gadea v. Star Cruises, Ltd., 949 So. 2d 1143, 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (citing Seabra v. Int'l Specialty Imp., Inc., 869 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)

Case No. 19-cv-22241-BLOOM/Louis (S.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2020)

Additionally, because "the extent of the long-arm statute is governed by Florida law, 'federal courts are required to construe it as would the Florida Supreme Court.'" Cable/Home Commc'n Corp., 902 F.2d at 856 (quoting Oriental Imps. & Exps., Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983)). "Absent some indication that the Florida Supreme Court would hold otherwise, [federal courts] are bound to adhere to decisions of its intermediate courts." Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Polskie Linie Oceaniczne, 795 F.2d at 970). "[T]he long-arm statute must be strictly construed, and any doubts about the applicability of the statute are resolved in favor of the defendant and against a conclusion that personal jurisdiction exists." Gadea v. Star Cruises, Ltd., 949 So. 2d 1143, 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (citing Seabra v. Int'l Specialty Imp., Inc., 869 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)).

Case No.: 632 F. Supp. 3d 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2022)

Schrier's reliance on Wultz fares no better. In Wultz, the estate of an American citizen who was killed in a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv sued the Bank of China for facilitating certain wire transfers to the terrorist organization that carried out the bombing. 755 F. Supp. 2d at 18-20. But the court exercised personal jurisdiction in that case because the bank's minimum contacts with the United States were so extensive that they "support[ed] a finding of general personal jurisdiction." Id. at 33 (emphasis added). The Bank of China had physical branches in California and New York, did extensive business throughout the United States, and held significant assets throughout the country. Ibid. In arriving at its conclusion, the court (notably) contrasted the Chinese bank's extensive U.S. contacts with a series of financial contacts the Eleventh Circuit had found insufficient to support the exercise of general jurisdiction in Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 892 (11th Cir. 1983). See Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 33-34 (distinguishing Oriental Imports because, in that case, "a foreign

Case No.: 755 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010)

The alleged jurisdictional fact that BOC does extensive business in the United States through its own branches supports a finding of general personal jurisdiction. Such a finding is supported by Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Maduro Curiel's Bank, N.V., a case in which a federal court did not find general personal jurisdiction over a foreign bank where the bank merely engaged in a correspondent relationship with banks in the forum. 701 F.2d 889, 891-92 (11th Cir. 1983). Under such relationships, in-forum banks provided financial services to customers of foreign banks. Id. Such a relationship provided insufficiently minimum contacts with the forum by the foreign bank in that case. Id. In this case, however, BOC does business directly through its own branches, not indirectly through third-party correspondents. BOC's contact with the United States is therefore far more significant. See In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 819-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) [hereinafter Terrorist Attacks I] (denying foreign bank's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in part because th

Case No.: 225 F. Supp. 3d 1269 (N.D. Ala. 2016)

The reach of the Alabama long-arm statute is a matter of Alabama law. Federal courts are required to construe the statute as would the Supreme Court of Alabama. See Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V. , 701 F.2d 889, 890–91 (11th Cir. 1983). Alabama's long-arm statute permits personal jurisdiction to the extent it "is not inconsistent with the constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States." Ala. R. Civ. P. 4.2(b). Thus, the real question here is whether assertion of personal jurisdiction over Moving Defendants comports with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Olivier v. Merritt Dredging Co. , 979 F.2d 827, 830 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Alabama Waterproofing Co. v. Hanby , 431 So.2d 141, 145 (Ala. 1983) ). Compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause exists where a defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, and where the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Olivier , 979 F.2d at 830–31 (quoting International Shoe , 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. 154 ); Madara v. Hall , 916 F.2d 1510, 1516 (11th Cir. 1990).

Case No.: Master File No. 2:13-CV-20000-RDP (N.D. Ala. Dec. 21, 2016)

The reach of the Alabama long-arm statute is a matter of Alabama law. Federal courts are required to construe the statute as would the Supreme Court of Alabama. See Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983). Alabama's long-arm statute permits personal jurisdiction to the extent it "is not inconsistent with the constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States." Ala. R. Civ. P. 4.2(b). Thus, the real question here is whether assertion of personal jurisdiction over Moving Defendants comports with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Olivier v. Merritt Dredging Co., 979 F.2d 827, 830 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Alabama Waterproofing Co. v. Hanby, 431 So. 2d 141, 145 (Ala. 1983)). Compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause exists where a defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, and where the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Olivier, 979 F.2d at 830-31 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316); Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1516 (11th Cir. 1990).

Case No.: 792 F. Supp. 1566 (S.D. Fla. 1992)

Before a federal court may exercise in personam jurisdiction, there must exist a basis for the Defendant's amenability to service of process, and a constitutionally sufficient relationship between the Defendant and forum, that is, minimum contacts. Omni Capital International Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff Co. Ltd., 484 U.S. 97, 104, 108 S.Ct. 404, 409, 98 L.Ed.2d 415 (1987); Delong, 840 F.2d at 847. As this is a diversity action, the undersigned may exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident Defendant to the extent permitted by the long-arm statute of the state in which the court sits. Oriental Imports and Exports, Inc. v. Maduro and Curiel's, 701 F.2d 889, 890 (11th Cir. 1983). The pertinent Florida Statute, § 48.193, sets forth two manners by which a non-resident can subject himself to personal jurisdiction: (1) the Defendant performs an act enumerated in Sections 48.193(1)(a) through (h), and the claim arises from those acts; or (2) the Defendant engages in substantial and not isolated activity within the state, regardless of the connection between the activity and the claim. Section 48.193(2).

Compare State of Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Plantation Square Assoc., 761 F. Supp. 1569 (S.D.Fla. 1991); Amerifirst Bank v. Bomar, 757 F. Supp. 1365 (S.D.Fla. 1991); Citron v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 1259 (S.D.Fla. 1989); Benjamin Geisinger v. Armstrong World Indus., 1990 WL 120749, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11061 (S.D.Fla. June 20, 1990) and cases cited therein, where the majority of judges of the Southern District of Florida have held the statute to be procedural, with Bankest Imports, Inc. v. ISCA Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1537 (S.D.Fla. 1989); Lewis v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 708 F. Supp. 1260 (M.D.Fla. 1989); Dah Chong Hong, Ltd. v. Silk Greenhouse, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 1072 (M.D.Fla. 1989); Lancer Arabians, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft, Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1444 (M.D.Fla. 1989) which hold the statute as substantive.

Case No. 02-02474 (Jointly Administered) (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 2004)

GASTONIA, NC 28053 CITY WATER LIGHT POWER $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $50,839.24 $50,839.24 ASSIGNEE DEUTSCHE BANK SECURITIES, INC 21 W. 52ND ST. NEW YORK, N.Y. 10019 CITY WATER LIGHT AND POWER $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $50

91765 Expired MOJICA, ORGA Commenced 35692 $0.00 $0.00 $80,000.00 $0.00 $80,000.00 URB. TOMAS CARRION MADURO CALLE 6 #15 Litigation JUANA DIAZ, PR 00795 MONROE, SHEIDA Previously 24289 $0.00 $0.00 $400.00 $0

Case No.: 590 F. Supp. 1109 (S.D. Fla. 1984)

A federal court in a diversity action such as this one may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only to the extent permitted by the long-arm statute of the forum state. Southwire Co. v. Transworld Metals Company Ltd., 735 F.2d 440 (11th Cir. 1984); Burger King Corp. v. Macshara, 724 F.2d 1505, 1508 (11th Cir. 1984); Oriental Imports Exports v. Maduro Curiels, 701 F.2d 889, 890 (11th Cir. 1983); Rubaii v. Lakewood Pipe of Texas, Inc., 695 F.2d 541 (11th Cir. 1983). The reach of the state's long-arm statute is a question of state law and a federal court must construe the statute as though it were the highest court of the state. Oriental Imports, 701 F.2d at 890-91.

Case No.: 697 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. La. 1988)

The Court notes at the outset that Florida has elected not to extend long arm jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution. Bloom v. A.H. Pond Co., Inc., 519 F. Supp. 1162, 1165 (S.D.Fla. 1981); Pollard v. Steel Systems Construction Co., Inc., 581 F. Supp. 1551, 1552 (S.D.Fla. 1984). Further, plaintiffs, as the party seeking to invoke jurisdiction under the long-arm statute, have the burden to plead sufficient material facts to establish the basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. See Oriental Imports Exports v. Maduro Curiels, 701 F.2d 889, 891 (11th Cir. 1983). Finally, the language setting forth the contacts must be strictly construed to ensure compliance with due process requirements. Aetna Life Casualty Co. v. Therm-O-Disc, Inc., 488 So.2d 83, 86 (Fla.App. 1st Dist. 1986).

Case No. 05-60421-CIV-UNGARO-BENAGES (S.D. Fla. Sep. 8, 2005)

The Court next considers the question of personal jurisdiction over Defendants, who do not reside in Florida. In order to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists when, as here. jurisdiction is based on a federal question arising under a statute that is silent regarding service of process, the Court "must undertake a two-part analysis. First, [the undersigned] must determine whether the Florida long-arm statute provides a basis for personal jurisdiction. If so. then [the undersigned] must determine whether sufficient minimum contacts exist between the defendants and the forum state so as to satisfy traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Sculpichair, Inc. v. Century Arts. Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir. 1996) (quotations and citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has made clear that "Florida's long-arm statute is to be strictly construed" and that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving personal jurisdiction." Id. at 627 (quoting Jet Charter Serv., Inc. v. Koeck, 907 F.2d 1110, 1112 (11th Cir. 1990). Oriental Imports Exports, Inc. v. Mahuro Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 891

Case No. 2:12-cv-473-UA-SPC (M.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2013)

This Court examines Florida's long-arm statute as would the Florida Supreme Court because the reach of the statute is a question of state law. See Oriental Imps. & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d 889, 890-91 (11th Cir. 1983). The Court must strictly construe the long-arm statute. Id. at 891. In diversity cases, the Court also applies the state's long-arm statute. Bank, N.A. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 926 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1991).

Case No.: 800 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1986)

Finally, the appellant argues they had a right of setoff which is superior to the Article 9 rights of Maduro. Strachan had no right of setoff which was superior to the secured interest of Maduro. The appellant cites the case of Citizens National Bank of Orlando v. Bornstein, 374 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1979) to support its position concerning its alleged security interest and possible setoff. The court in Citizen's National Bank when discussing Fla.Stat. § 679.104(9) stated: "The section means simply that a right of setoff may exist in the creditor who does not have a security interest." Id. at 10.

Case No.: 21-20706-Civ-GAYLES/TORRES (S.D. Fla. Jul. 19, 2023)

The torture and murder of Mr. Alban, which, as alleged by Plaintiffs, included severe beatings, waterboarding, and electrocution, also posed inherent dangers to human life. Additionally, all these actions were intended to “intimidate, injure, or coerce a civilian population.” Fla. Stat. § 775.30(1)(b)(1). The high-profile kidnapping and murder of Mr. Alban by Maduro regime agents were designed to deter other opposition members from speaking out against the Venezuelan government. See Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F.Supp.2d 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that allegations that Jordanian bank knowingly provided services that facilitated the actions of terrorist organizations were sufficient to state claims for violations of federal ATA provisions prohibiting financing terrorism).

Case No.: 833 F.2d 1477 (11th Cir. 1987

Having reviewed the complaints in both Maduro I and Maduro II, the jury instructions from Maduro I, and the trial transcript from Maduro I, we find that Maduro actually presented two claims in Maduro I. The first is a claim for breach of an alleged contract or promissory note executed in connection with stevedoring and other marine necessaries which Maduro allegedly furnished to vessels owned by Gorbea; the second is a claim against Naviera Gorbea for fraudulently inducing Maduro to refrain from foreclosing alleged maritime liens on the vessels. The pretrial stipulation and the jury verdict from Maduro I indicate that only the breach of contract claim went to the jury; the district court's judgment indicates that Maduro's claim for fraudulent inducement was dismissed on a directed verdict.

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Res judicata is claim preclusion; it refers to the preclusive effect of a judgment in foreclosing relitigation of matters that were litigated or could have been litigated in an earlier lawsuit. I.A. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson National Bank, 793 F.2d 1541, 1549 (11th Cir. 1986); Interstate Pipe Maintenance, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F.2d 1495, 1497 (11th Cir. 1985). The purpose of claim preclusion is to avoid multiple suits on identical claims between the same parties. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131, 99 S.Ct. 2205, 2209, 60 L.Ed.2d 767, 771 (1979); Ray v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 677 F.2d 818, 821 (11th Cir. 1982).

Case No.: CIVIL ACTION NO. 2003/146 (D.V.I. Sep. 16, 2010)

As required by Section VIII.A.1 of the ARA, WWT designated BPPR account #193-331879 as the account into which all proceeds of sales on ARC traffic documents would be deposited and against which ARC's area bank would be authorized to draw checks for payment to ARC of the traffic documents. (the "designated account"). (Maduro Dep. #2 17:1-21; A. Belfon Dep. 15:23-16:23, 84:4-85:19.) WWT used the ARC traffic documents to print air passenger tickets from WWT's computers for clients, each of which had three copies: one for the client, one for WWT as agent, and one for ARC as auditor (the "auditor's coupon"). (A. Belfon Dep. 14:7-15:22; Maduro Dep. 22:13-26:24.) The client would pay WWT for the ticket and, as required by Section VIII.A.2 3 of the ARA, WWT would submit a weekly report to ARC listing the ticket sales and attaching all the auditor's coupons. (Maduro Dep. 24:2-25:15.) In addition, the report included a settlement authorization form to ARC, which allowed ARC to directly draw specified amounts from WWT's designated account for payment of the traffic documents. (Id. at 26:10-27:5; ARA VIII.A.2 3.) The reports were to be submitted within the

Case No.: Civil Action 2016-0066 (D.V.I. Jul. 10, 2023)

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, on September 1, 2006, Maduro executed and delivered a promissory note (the “Note”) in favor of Flagstar Bank, FSB (“Flagstar”) in the principal amount of $76,000.00. (Dkt. No. 10 at ¶ 6). As security for the Note, Maduro executed and delivered to Flagstar and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), as nominee for Flagstar, its successors, and assigns, a mortgage (the “Mortgage”), encumbering property described in the Warranty Deed as:

Case No.: Misc. 19-290-LPS (D. Del. Mar. 23, 2023) 

69. The U.S. government, acting through its Executive Branch, has expressly declared its non-recognition of the Maduro Regime, stating: "The United States does not recognize the Maduro regime as the government of Venezuela," adding: "the United States does not consider former president Nicolas Maduro to have the legal authority" to act on behalf of the Republic. (Meehan Decl. Ex. 3) The U.S. has also "refused to recognize Maduro as Venezuela's head of state." (Meehan Decl. Ex. 2 at 2)

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90. On November 19,2019, the National Assembly executed an "Agreement that Authorized the Creation of the Special Litigation Fund" ("Litigation Fund Agreement"), which established a "Special Litigation Fund" consisting of resources found in bank accounts abroad in favor of, among others, the State (i.e., the Republic of Venezuela), the Central Bank of Venezuela, and PDVSA. (Fourth Yanos Decl. Ex. 16)

Case No.: 191 B.R. 944 (S.D. Fla. 1995)

SeaEscape purchased airline tickets from Maduro Travel in order to transport personnel and crew members to vessels in different ports. Upon receipt of a ticket request from SeaEscape, Maduro Travel would search for the lowest air fare, issue a ticket and generate an invoice. Maduro Travel paid for the ticket through ARC automatic bank payment and Maduro Travel billed SeaEscape for the tickets and commissions.